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Genie in the Bottle:
Intellectual Property Legislation and
The Flow of Information
Professor Margaret Ann Wilkinson,
Faculty of Law, and
Faculty of Information and Media Studies
My thanks to Law Student Amy Dixon 
(Funded by the Law Foundation of Ontario) & 
my colleagues Professors Trosow & Perry
Genie in the Bottle:
Intellectual Property Legislation and
The Flow of Information
My thanks to Connie Crosby for this timely title!
Here was my original mouthful…
Does Canadian Intellectual Property Legislation 
Facilitate or Impede Access to Information for 
Users?
Genie in the Bottle:
Does Canadian Intellectual Property Legislation Facilitate or 
Impede Access to Information for Users?
riklewis@ibm.net “The Genie in the Bottle” July 1996 Wine Editorial 
–paraphrasing:
every bottle of wine is a living thing which will turn out 
well or badly depending upon how it is treated – and 
much of this instability or excellence depends upon 
the presence or absence of oxygen in the wine
early on in the life of the wine, oxygen contributes to 
its appeal… later on, oxidization can contribute to the 
decline of a vintage
the key is balance !
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So too in Intellectual Property:
Too few rights for creators and authors and there is 
little incentive to be creative
Vietnam
Too many rights for creators and authors stifles 
creativity and inventiveness in society
Marilyn Randall  Pragmatic Plagarism (UTP, 2003)
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So where are we in Canada in 2003?
Patent
Harvard Mouse
Monsanto v. Schmeiser
Trademark
United Grain Growers (“Country Living”)
Confidential Information
Cadbury-Schweppes (Caesar Cocktail)
Personal Data Protection and Privacy Issues
PIPEDA
Copyright and Moral Rights
US  Eldred
Théberge
Delrina
Tariff 22
CCH  v.  LSUC
Bill C-36
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Patent
The traditional formulation of the balance is 
• A 20 year monopoly on manufacture, use and sale
• In return for public disclosure of the invention
Harvard Mouse case
Only the patent claim involving the mouse itself was in issue
The rest of the patent involving the gene is registered in 
Canada, as it is worldwide
Canada is standing alone in its interpretation of patentable 
subject matter
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Harvard University
Patented gene cells
Who owns the offspring?
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Legend: Illustration of how 
transgenic mice are produced.
Genes responsible for particular 
traits or disease susceptibility 
are chosen and extracted. Next 
they are injected into fertilized 
mouse eggs. Embryos are 
implanted in the uterus of a 
surrogate mother. The selected 
genes will be expressed by 
some of the offspring.
Since the first gene transfers into 
mice were successfully executed 
in 1980, transgenic mice have 
allowed researchers to observe 
experimentally what happens to 
an entire organism during the 
progression of a disease. 
Transgenic mice have become 
models for studying human 
diseases and their treatments. 
http://www.accessexcellence.org/AB/GG/transgenic.html
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Commissioner of Patents v. Harvard College
Decision:
(Majority- Bastarache, L'Heureux-Dubé, Gonthier, Iacobucci, and LeBel): 
• Since the Commissioner has no discretion independent of the 
Patent Act to consider the public interest when granting or denying 
a patent, the Commissioner's decision in this case, given its 
nature, is not owed deference.(SCC agrees with FCA here –
standard is correctness)
• Sole question in this appeal is whether the words "manufacture" 
and "composition of matter", within the context of the Patent Act, 
are sufficiently broad to include higher life forms.  
• It is irrelevant whether this Court believes that higher life forms 
such as the oncomouse ought to be patentable.
• The best reading of the words of the Act supports the conclusion 
that higher life forms are not patentable.
2002 SCC
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But would anyone reproducing the Harvard Mouse be 
caught as infringing the gene patents issued, even 
though the mouse itself is not patented in Canada, 
according to the reasoning in the Monsanto decision ?
Leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada in 
Monsanto has been given
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Monsanto v. Schmeiser
http://www.monsanto.com.au/
canola/pd_1round.htm
2002
Federal Court of Appeal
Percy & Louise 
Schmeiser
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2001
F.C.T.D.Monsanto v. Schmeiser
1. Is the patent infringed if 
Schmeiser did not use 
Roundup in the 1998 crop? 
1. Uncontradicted evidence is that D did not spray 
Roundup on his 1998 canola crop. Trial Judge did 
not say whether he believed him on that point or 
not, because he concluded that spraying with 
Roundup was not an essential element of the 
alleged infringement.
2. Trial Judge did not reach any conclusion 
as to how glyphosate resistant canola 
came to be there in 1997, because in his 
view it did not matter.
Issues on Appeal:
2. Does it matter how the 
Monsanto gene came to be 
in the 1998 Schmeiser crop? 
3. Did the Trial Judge 
misapprehend the evidence 
or consider inadmissible 
evidence?
3. Evidence of crop sampling and testing? 
Was evidence taken on behalf of Monsanto 
in breach of a court order? If there was 
illegally obtained evidence, should it have 
been excluded?
4. Did the Trial Judge err in the 
relief granted?
4. Is injunction overly broad? Are damages 
excessive? Cross-Appeal: too low?
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www.cartooncritters.com/bull.htm
• defendant’s bull strays on plaintiff’s land 
and impregnates plaintiff’s cow
• calf belongs to plaintiff landowner not 
defendant bull-owner
• bull-owner further liable for damages in 
trespass
• Part of larger common-law of admixture 
(if a first party  allows inter-mingling of 
property with property of second party, 
property belongs to second party)
Schmeiser argues analogy to common law 
liability rules for stray animals:
Court rejects this argument as inapplicable 
to patent law -- no authority for the 
proposition that ownership of a plant must 
necessarily supercede the rights of the 
patent holder for a gene f und in the plant.
Bull analogy
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Monsanto v. Schmeiser
1. Is the patent infringed if 
Schmeiser did not use 
Roundup in the 1998 crop? 
1. Trial Judge correctly applied the 
principles applicable to                     
the construction of patent claims.
2. The source of the Roundup resistant 
canola in the defendants' 1997 crop is 
really not significant for the resolution 
of the issue of infringement which 
relates to the 1998 crop. D planted 
canola seed saved from 1997, which 
seed he knew or ought to have known 
was Roundup  tolerant, and that seed 
was the primary source for seeding all 
nine fields of canola in 1998.
Findings of the Court:Issues on Appeal :
3. No error by the Trial Judge that 
warrants the intervention of this Court
4. No errors in remedies4. Did The Trial Judge err in the 
relief granted?
3. Did the Trial Judge consider 
inadmissible evidence?
2. Does it matter how 
Monsanto’s gene came to be in 
the 1998 crop?
2002
Federal Court of Appeal
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But would anyone reproducing the Harvard Mouse be caught as 
infringing the gene patents issued, even though the mouse itself is 
not patented in Canada, according to the reasoning in the 
Monsanto decision ?
If the patented genes were known to be in the mice in question, 
regardless of how they got there, then the person breeding the mice, 
like Schmeiser, would be guilty of patent infringement
If the person breeding the mice was unaware of the presence of the 
patented gene, how would the mice be saleable?
So, really, the oncomouse cannot be freely bred and sold in 
Canada…
Leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada in Monsanto has 
been given
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Canada Biotechnology Ministerial Coordinating 
Committee Recommendations
FARMERS’  PRIVILEGE
3. We recommend that a farmers’ 
privilege provision be included in 
the Patent Act. It should specify 
that farmers are permitted to save 
and sow seeds from patented 
plants or to breed patented 
animals, as long as these progeny 
are not sold as commercial 
propagating material or in a manner 
that undermines the commercial 
value to its creator of a genetically 
engineered animal, respectively. 
The drafting of this provision must 
be sensitive to the differences that 
exist both in the nature and use of 
plants and non-human animals
INNOCENT  BYSTANDERS
4. We recommend that the Patent Act 
include provisions that protect innocent 
bystanders from claims of patent 
infringement with respect to adventitious 
spreading of patented seed or patented 
genetic material or the insemination of an 
animal by a patented animal.
LIABILITY  FOR  DAMAGES
6. We recommend that Canada actively 
participate in international negotiations to 
address issues of liability and redress for 
adventitious spreading of patented seed or 
genetic material or the insemination of an 
animal by a patented animal.
PATENTING OF HIGHER LIFE FORMS AND RELATED ISSUES: Report to the Government of Canada 
Biotechnology Ministerial Coordinating Committee – June 2002
http://www.cbac-cccb.ca/documents/en/E980_IC_IntelProp.pdf
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Trademark
What is the “balance” in intellectual property terms?
Potentially indefinite use of the “mark” in connection with goods or 
services
In return for maintaining a clear image in the minds of the public
Canada does not protect “famous marks”
What is the relationship between “marks” and text?
• Domain names
• Country Living case
– What is “use” in a text context – are we talking a “good”, as registered, or 
a “service”?
– United Grain Growers Ltd.  v. Lang Mitchener F.C.A..
– Various uses within the text was enough text to save the registration
– Leave to Appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada given
– The case settled
FIMS student Natasha Gerolami has verified, in a thorough literature 
review, my anecdotal experience that intellectual property theorists do 
not actually carry through testing their theoretical models for Intellectual 
Property with TM
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Confidential Information
Some purists do not even consider Confidential Information to be 
an aspect of Intellectual Property
Certainly, it seems to lack any public interest balance at all
But it seems to be increasingly encroaching upon the balance that 
Intellectual Property was meant to have created:
In the Cadbury-Schweppes case, the SCC made a decision involving Mott’s 
trade secret in Clamato Juice, the subsequent sale of Mott to Cadbury-
Schweppes, the bankruptcy of the original licensor and confidante Caesar 
Canning, and subsequent adaptation of the recipe by FBI Foods, a third 
party to the confidence, and ultimate production of Caesar Cocktail, a 
competitor now to Cadbury-Schweppes ownership of Clamato juice
Most importantly here, Binnie completely accepted the concept of protecting 
a confidence beyond the confidential relationship of the confider to the 
confidante and into the subsequent relationship between a third party to the 
confidence and the original confider.
Instead of accepting the balances decreed by the old IP devices, 
companies can choose the expanding protection of confidentiality
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Personal Data Protection and Privacy
Personal Data Protection legislation is another area 
of law which most people would not consider a part of 
Intellectual Property law
My colleague Myra Tawfik in the Faculty of Law at Windsor 
teaches this area as part of her Confidential Information 
course
At Western, I have always taught it as part of my Information 
Law course, but increasingly we have devoted some class 
time to it in Intellectual Property
Similarly, privacy protection is not generally 
considered relevant to IP, but is now more widely 
considered in this context
Why?
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Why ?   For three reasons:
With the obverse Access legislation in the public sector, protections such 
that provided by the action for Breach of Confidential Information are not 
secure when the access legislation creates a right of access to information 
which, unless statutorily excepted, must be released by government even 
though received from the private sector and otherwise protect-able by the 
private sector business
Personal data protection has been extended legislatively from the public 
into the private sector and is creating rights in the subject of information 
rather than in the creators and authors of the intellectual property in the 
information
Conflict appears inevitable between the regimes
The subject of my current research
The access and personal data protection schemes have their own balances  --
but those balances are along entirely different axis than those along which the 
intellectual property devices are balanced
Privacy torts, whether created at common law or through statute (now in 4 
provinces), limit publication, as in the Aubry decision, and frustrate (or 
override) the balances designed into copyright law
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Copyright
The potential impact of the American Eldred decision 
on Canadian copyright policy
Théberge – SCC
Delrina – Ont.C.A. – leave to appeal to SCC denied
Tariff 22 on appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada
CCH et al v. LSUC on appeal to the Supreme Court 
of Canada
The Copyright reform process  Bill C-36
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Eldred case
On the Constitutionality of the American term extension to 70 years
USSC found the extension within the Constitutional competence of 
Congress under the “copyright clause” - not open to freedom of 
speech challenge
In Canada, our “Constitutional” reference to copyright is only in 
terms of the division of powers, there is no definition involving 
balance as in the U.S.
Would a term extension constitutional challenge end differently in Canada?
Would a constitutional challenge even be available in Canada?  The Ontario 
trial division Michelin decision would suggest no – this is not a matter of public 
law susceptible to Charter scrutiny but is rather only about private rights – but 
this must be wrong in the statutory areas of IP
s.2(b) freedom of expression could be argued – and the section 1 text may well 
mean that a long extension might be found to be more than can be reasonably 
and demonstrably justified in a free and democratic nation
(Law student Ryan Steiner’s recent argument about how this would be 
demonstrated empirically for the courts)
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• defendant art galleries purchase cards, photolithographs and posters embodying 
various of the artist's works from copyright holder plaintiff
• defendants transfer the image to canvas using a chemical process that allowed 
them to lift the ink layer from the paper (leaving it blank) and to display it on 
canvas
Théberge v. Galerie d’Art – the Supreme Court of Canada
Painting
Painting
Note: To avoid any violations of copyright law, Mr.Théberge’s artwork was removed 
from this page
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• after the transfer, the image no longer remains on the 
original paper
• artist claims violation of his section 3(1) right "to produce or 
reproduce the work ... in any material form whatever“
• galleries claim no reproduction occurred because there was 
no increase in the number of works
Théberge v. Galerie d’Art
before after
Number of 
usable works
1 1
fixations
1 2
majority
dissent
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2002 SCC
Cause of Action: interlocutory 
injunction application – from a 
seizure by the bailiff under Quebec 
Civil Code – not characterized as a 
moral rights case because this 
remedy (seizure) not available in 
moral rights 
The applicant Theberge would not 
want to discuss moral rights because 
he wants to uphold a seizure by the 
bailiff only available to him under 
economic rights; the respondent 
Galerie would not want to raise moral 
rights because they would arise in the 
applicant Theberge, not in them as 
assignees.
4-3 split, civil judges would have allowed the appeal, Gonthier, L’Heureux-Dube, LeBel (droit 
d’auteur), common law judges (copyright) in the majority, Binnie, McLachlin CJ, Iacobucci 
and Major.
The majority uses the distinction between moral rights and economic rights to find that the 
economic rights at issue here cannot extend to cover these uses 
Since there was no infringement of economic rights found, the seizure was not proper – now 
Theberge is apparently beginning again, this time claiming infringement of his moral rights
Theberge v. Galerie d’Art du Petit Champlain
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Moral Rights
• Some commentators have questioned the constitutionality of 
moral rights
• Are they “personal rights” within the meaning of Constitution 
Article 92(13)?
• Or are they necessarily “incidental” to the otherwise federal scope 
of copyright?
• AGs were notified of issue raised by defendant in Snow but did 
not intervene
• an open question?
Theberge is being pursued now in the Quebec courts as a moral 
rights case
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2002- Ont.C.A
(Leave to appeal to SCC denied)
Cause of Action: Appeal of 
dismissal of copyright claim. Trial 
judge denied copyright protection 
on grounds of merger. Ont CA 
agreed
Facts: Duncombe was employed by 
Delrina to improve performance 
monitoring system. After leaving 
Delrina, Duncombe begins developing 
a similar system at Triolet, to 
compete. Delrina sues.
“Copying” doesn’t just include literal copying from what is in front of copier.  
Includes copying from subconscious memory
But features similar to both programs are not capable of copyright protection
Functional considerations are not protected by copyright (basic 
expression/idea dichotomy)
Merger:  if idea can only be expressed in one (or very limited) ways – then 
expression merges with idea – NO COPYRIGHT
Avoids giving a copyright owner a monopoly  on the idea or function itself.
Delrina v. Triolet Systems
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Tariff 22 from the FCA to the SCC
-Focuses on the role of collectives in Canada
-Decision, because of its origins, limited to two rights only:
-Communication by telecommunication and authorizing same
BOARD
-To decide where a communication
happens – look at where the originating
server is located
F.C.A.
-NO – normal conflict rules
must be applied
-ISP’s are only providing the means of
telecommunications and therefore are
never liable in copyright
-NO – ISP’s who cache go
beyond providing means –
to providing content and are
therefore liable in copyright
COPYRIGHT BOARD and F.C.A.
-Posting a work on the net is authorizing its communication – and 
communication occurs when the item is retrieved by an end user
-When a content provider intends the public to have access, that is a
communication by telecommunication to the public under s.3(1)(f)
from the FCA
to the SCC
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FCA , on 
appeal to SCC
First: ….. The FCA reverses the Trial 
Court to find requisite originality such 
that copyright subsists in the subject 
works, and that there was an 
infringement.  
Second:  Is there a Fair-dealing defense?
Distinction in section 29 between “research” and “private study:” So 
research is not excluded from exemption if in non-private setting (as 
urged by publishers - is the apparent distinction between research 
and study really useful?)
Law Society shares purposes of patron – library steps into 
shoes of patron and can claim exemption allowable to end-user 
(para. 143)
Court then lists factors to consider in order to determine “fairness”
CCH Canadian v. LSUC
•Prima facie case for 
infringement shown
•Issue now turns to 
defenses (onus on LSUC)
©  Professor Margaret Ann Wilkinson 2003 
FCA Fair dealing factors in CCH v. LSUC
• purpose of the dealing:
• must be an allowable purpose, one mentioned in the act
• character of the dealing:
• how was the infringing work dealt with?
• amount of the dealing:
• what was the amount and substantiality of portion used in relation 
to the whole work?
• alternatives to the dealing:
• defense more likely allowed where no alternative available
• nature of the work:
• i.e., strong public interest in access to legal resources
• economic impact on owner:
• how is market for work impacted by fair-dealing in question?
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The Supreme Court of Canada,
on the proper balance in copyright :
“Excessive control by holders of copyrights and other 
forms of intellectual property may unduly limit the 
ability of the public domain to incorporate and 
embellish creative innovation in the long-term 
interests of society as a whole, or create practical 
obstacles to proper utilization.”   paragraph 32 Theberge
“The proper balance… lies not only in recognizing the 
creator’s rights but in giving due weight to their 
limited nature.  In crassly economic terms it would be 
as inefficient to overcompensate artists… as it would 
be self-defeating to undercompensate them.”
paragraph 31 Theberge
The Supreme Court of the United States in Eldred spoke in similar terms… 
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Fair-dealing defense?
After engaging in an extended discussion about what constitutes fair-
dealing, the court refuses to make a blanket ruling about the LSUC’s 
activity.  
Too fact dependent for generalization in this case?
CCH Canadian v. LSUC -- defenses
Library defenses?
New section added to Act since case arose.  But court discusses 
the new s. anyway  - “to give guidance”
Defendant qualifies as “library, archive, museum” within meaning of 
Act (contra argument of CCH)
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Unsatisfactory all round:
No injunction for publishers
No damages for publishers
Publishers get declarations: copyright subsists in their works so 
there was prima facie infringement
LSUC is told fair dealing defenses cannot be applied to operation 
of copying service in general but may be applicable to individual 
cases – and where the patron is fair dealing, the library can also 
have that defense
issue of costs reserved
court pushes parties to “negotiate a just compromise among 
themselves”
CCH v. LSUC – disposition on appeal
NOTE:  both sides issued press releases claiming victory!
Now, SCC has given leave
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Copyright Reform Process
Bill C-36
Amends the Copyright Act, inter alia
Longer term protection for unpublished or posthumously 
published works of authors who died before 1949
“the Lucy Maud Montgomery amendment”
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Where is the balance in Canada?
Patent
Despite no life form patenting in theHarvard Mouse decision,
Monsanto at this stage tips the balance toward the patent owners, even, it 
would appear, when patented elements appear in higher life forms
Trademark
Though the SCC was interested, settlement means the highest authority 
now, the FCA, hold use of text anywhere in a product to be “use” in 
connection with goods for purposes of maintaining registration
Confidential Information
There is no real balance here:  if confidentiality requirements are met, 
breach of confidence is actionable – even, under the SCC’s Cadbury –
Schweppes, as against use of the information by third parties never involved 
in the original confider-confidante relationship
Personal Data Protection and Privacy
As these rights are extended, a new player with rights to control information 
and keep it from the public domain enters the equation:  the subject of the 
information 
Copyright
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Where is the balance in Canada?
Illusion of being with public
Power of the TM holder seems to be growing
No balance & increasing reach
Different balances
(but power to subjects, not public access)
Patent
Trademark
Confidential Information
Personal Data Protection and Privacy
Unpredictable
Copyright
U.S. Eldred – probably different outcome 
in Canada – could limit extensions
Theberge – economic rights limited
Delrina – economic rights limited
Tariff 22 – the Internet is regulated
• And players identified for liability
CCH v. LSUC – balance unusual
Copyright reform – Bill C-36 – extends 
copyrights
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early on in the life of a wine, oxygen contributes to its appeal… 
later on, oxidization can contribute to the decline of a vintage
early on in the life of an industrialized economy, Intellectual 
Property Rights contributes to its Competitiveness… later on, in 
an information economy, over-extension of Intellectual Property 
Rights may contribute to the decline of local identity and 
innovation
The key is balance – but a balance of what factors ?
The American public / private balance should differ from the 
Canadian
The Canadian Balance must include Respect for 3rd axis 
–Public access  /  private economic rights  / national culture
Does Canadian Intellectual Property Legislation Facilitate 
or Impede Access to Information for Users?
